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ABSTRACT
Under what conditions is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) able to successfully repatriate and reintegrate refugees to their country of
origin? This work aims to evaluate the success of UNHCR’s initiative to sponsor the
repatriation and reintegration of political refugees who voluntarily chose to return to their
homeland. The study of political refugees is essential in International Relations, since it
entails the failure of preventing ethnic violence and civil unrest. Overall, the emergence
of refugees is the product of the inability of conflict prevention. Voluntary repatriation
and reintegration of these refugees provides a message of mending relations, state rebuilding and hope. Successful repatriation is the return of refugees with the expectation
of a safe return to society. Successful reintegration however ensures their inclusion in
society. Therefore, both terms may be related, but must be discussed separately. This
inclusion is essential to reconciliation, and the formation of a peaceful, stable society.
Hence, this research will bring a better understanding of victims of conflict, the inability
of the state to protect its citizens, and possible patterns of repatriation, reintegration and
conflict resolution.

To answer the question of the success of UNHCR’s policies of

repatriation and reintegration, I will use two cross-regional case studies: Guatemala and
Afghanistan. I will address the hardship undergone by political refugees, the policies
they have encountered from UNHCR, and the scenario of voluntary repatriation patterns.
I will then evaluate the conditions on the ground to which refugees are returning.
Clearly, if these have a high violence rate, a sustainable life and successful reintegration
is very unlikely.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction

Research Question

The study of political refugees is essential in International Relations. It entails the
failure of preventing ethnic violence and civil unrest, since the emergence of refugees is
the product of the inability of conflict prevention. This work aims to evaluate the success
of UNHCR’s initiative to sponsor the repatriation and reintegration of political refugees
who voluntarily chose to return to their homeland in two cases: Guatemala and
Afghanistan, and why have the results differed so much. Hence, the following question
arises: Under what conditions and strategies is the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) able to successfully repatriate and reintegrate refugees to their
country of origin? This question arises from the similarity of refugee situation in both
situations and how repatriation efforts veered into different plans of action that despite
having the same purpose had very diverse results. Hence, this thesis will evaluate which
repatriation tactic is more effective and why.

Significance of This Topic

In the year 2003 alone the number of Refugees and Asylum Seekers was of
11,900,000 people.1 This does not account for the internally displaced population
(IDP’s). Clearly this Diaspora is a product of internal conflict and often of state-led
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violence that has scaled to a fatal extent. As a result refugees migrate to seek their
survival, often to foreign lands. Here they not only constitute a humanitarian issue, but
an economic one as well.

International Organizations and host countries incur in

expenditures when providing shelter, food, medical attention and at times educational
programs for refugees.
The international community’s failure to avoid these conflicts has led to the
intervention after the conflict has erupted in a massive scale. This displacement is a
result of humans’ worst actions: Ethnic cleansing, genocide or any form of persecution
that threatens human life.2 Refugees, therefore represent the fear, misery and suffering
that most of us fail to see when we study violence.
Another aspect of refugees that is often overlooked is that movement of people is
part of a globalization pattern. As the world becomes more interdependent, we will see
how the emergence of refugees affects us all.

Refugees may indirectly become key

players in domestic issues to the host country, since refugee camps have proven to
become an economic burden for it.3 A consequence of the perception of refugees having
a negative impact in a host county has been disparity in Asylum policies and ethnic
discrimination, as we will see in the case of Afghans in Pakistan. Another impact is the
acquiring of a heterogeneous society. For instance, Afghan refugees in Pakistan were
known to have economic and environmental impact in Pakistan, and there was a fear that
the longer they remained in Pakistan, they would likely become or form an influential
political force.4 A local example has been the impact of the influx of Cuban refugees in
South Florida and their role in urban development and to the representation of Latin
participation in politics.5 Like any Diaspora, refugees will change the face of the society
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they chose to migrate to. Some examples of refugees that have had key impact in their
country of asylum have been James Joban (the Architect of the White House), Albert
Einstein, Frederic Chopin, Isabel Allende or Clara Zetkin (Female activist and founder of
International Women’s Day).6
Voluntary repatriation and reintegration of these refugees provides a message of
mending relations, state re-building and hope. Successful repatriation is the return of
refugees with the expectation of a safe return to society.

Successful reintegration

however ensures their inclusion in society. Therefore, both terms may be related, but
must be discussed separately.

This inclusion is essential to reconciliation, and the

formation of a peaceful, stable society. Hence, this research brings a better understanding
of victims of conflict, the inability of the state to protect its citizens, and possible patterns
of repatriation, reintegration and conflict resolution. Perhaps the most influential lesson
in this thesis will be the analysis of the true consequences in reintegration.

By

questioning the method employed at each reintegration case, we will find out why
reintegration was quite successful in the case of Guatemala and unsuccessful in
Afghanistan.

Theoretical Context

According to the UN 1951 Convention on the status of refugees, they are defined
as individuals who have fled their country of origin with a well founded fear of
persecution due to political opinion, ethnicity, religion or social group they belong to and
are therefore unable (or unwilling) to return to their country.7 The UNHCR Handbook on
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Repatriation also defines repatriation as the returning to a country of origin with the
assumption of conflict resolution and the end of refugees’ “well founded fear of
persecution”.
Political refugees are clearly a product of ethnic violence, war or state-led
violence. When attempts of conflict resolution fail to prevent this violence, the rational
human action will be to seek survival.

A wave of forced migration emerges as a

consequence of the lack of conflict prevention and/or resolution. When confronted with a
significant amount of refugees, UNHCR sees itself with three possible solutions: (1)
Voluntary repatriation and reintegration, (2) Integration into host country and (3)
Resettlement to a third country. The last two solutions are often employed when conflict
resolution in the country of origin has not yet been achieved. For the scope of this thesis
however, I limit the research to voluntary repatriation organized and funded by
UNHCR’s long-term repatriation and reintegration programs. The purpose for this focus
is to evaluate the effectiveness of UNHCR-funded programs. To achieve this, there must
be a clear distinction between repatriation and reintegration. As I had mentioned earlier,
repatriation simply involves movement. Reintegration on the other hand, implies greater
equality, successful mending of differences and a sustainable livelihood for returnees.
Hence, reintegration is defined as the inclusion of returnees into the protection of the
state’s legal system, equal protection and equal access to public goods, such as access to
heath, education, food and political involvement.8
To answer the question of the success of UNHCR’s policies of repatriation and
reintegration, I have used two cross-regional case studies: Guatemala and Afghanistan. I
have addressed the hardship undergone by political refugees, the policies they have
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encountered from UNHCR, and the scenario of voluntary repatriation patterns. I then
evaluated the conditions on the ground to which refugees are returning in terms of
structural and behavioral violence, which I will discuss in detail in the methodology
employed. Clearly, if these cases have a high violence rate, a sustainable life and
successful reintegration is very unlikely. As the dependent variables for this research,
repatriation and reintegration success relies on two main factors: (1) the conditions on the
ground of the country of origin and (2) the efficiency of UNHCR’s strategy.

Literature Review

The UNHCR9 provides a vast collection of numerical data on the amount of
refugees worldwide as well as reports by its inspectors on the situation in refugee camps
and repatriated areas. For this research, I made use of UNHCR’s Handbook on Voluntary
Repatriation: International Projection (1996), where I found the mandate of UNHCR’s
voluntary repatriation programs as well as the methods (or strategies) to be employed.
Overall, UNHCR is responsible for seeking whatever solution is best and permanent for
the refugee population. This is commonly achieved in cooperation with a third party (the
state), whether it is the country of origin or another who is willing to integrate the
Diaspora into its society (also known as resettlement).

A key component of any

repatriation model employed is that it must be voluntary and it should be facilitated and
promoted once the conditions are safe for the return.

Another component is the

arrangement of conflict resolution with the country of origin, as well as constant
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assistantship and monitoring of the conditions of returnees.

These conditions for

repatriation are key to the evaluation of strategies employed in each case study.
UNHCR also provides an extensive list of online publications on the situation of
the countries in conflict (or countries of origin) as well of host countries. Through
reports by UNHCR inspectors, they inform of the limitations and success stories of
groups returning and reintegrating, or integrating into a host country. These reports
served as a guide to determine the degree of success for reintegration.
To complement the UNHCR reports, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
(AREU) and publications by the US Committee for Refugees (USCR) offer insightful
details on the disadvantages of the process of return and the lack of ability for returnees
to have a sustainable life. They also point out the limitations encountered by UNHCR
when addressing refugees’ needs.
Another critique of the existing asylum policies is the work of Arthur C. Helton
(2002). He argues the importance of refugee studies has been overlooked, even though it
is clearly a significant and growing issue.

He analyzes global policies and makes

suggestions for new approaches (especially from the US). He argues that the importance
of refugees has been disregarded but it needs to be a priority in the agenda. By attacking
the problem of forced migration, the root comes down to the need of international
cooperation before the crises occur.

He concludes his book by suggesting the re-

organization of humanitarian agencies in the US to deal with this growing matter. This
work is essential for this research, since it provides a study of existing policies of asylum
and its limitations.

It also suggests solutions to the core of the problem of the

indifference towards refugee populations.
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Stephen J. Steadman’s and Fred Tanner (2003) provide another perspective of a
new set of problems refugees encounter.

They argue that despite International

Organizations and NGO’s efforts to aid refugees, some host countries (in a bilateral
relationship) have manipulated diasporas for their own advantage. In fact, the book’s
contributors analyze how International Organizations have indirectly contributed to this
manipulation. There are 3 case studies in this book: Cambodian refugees along the Thai
border in the 1970s and 1980s, Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and
Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire from 1994–96.

They conclude manipulation is

allowed to occur because the international refugee regime and major states have not
identified a consistent approach to stopping it. In the post-Cold War era the United
Nations and its members have chosen to treat the issue as a humanitarian problem instead
of a security problem. In other words, the main target to avoid forced migration should
be to take preventive measures to avoid conflicts, persecution and ethnic violence.
However, conflicts are not prevented, and the aftermath falls into patronizing
humanitarian relief instead of aiming for security and preventive action.

This work,

along with Helton’s, helped question the role of UNHCR as a real solution to the refugee
situation.
As an example of the impact returnees have had in past situations, I took into
account the work of Lynellyn D. Long and Ellen Oxfeld (2004). The book offers an
anthropological approach through ethnography of several case studies of refugees. The
book mostly addresses the impact return movements have had in the country of origin as
well as returnees’ state of mind. They discuss the impact a life in exile has had and how
these experiences shape attitudes when returning to the country of origin in different
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panoramas: social, political economic and cultural. Return is argued within the literature
to be a way to mend past differences. However, this book addresses the other side of the
story; the re-fueling of pre-existing ethnic hatreds and how this makes repatriation a
nightmare, rather than a reconstruction of the homeland. Case studies include Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Vietnam, China, Philippines, German Jews, Nicaragua and Sarajevo.

The

theoretical context of this book has been essential to this research, since it analyzed the
general impact of repatriation not limited to the role of UNHCR.
Marjoleine Zieck (2004) analyzes the legal meaning of voluntary repatriation
employed by the UNHCR, its place within the framework of universal refugee law, and
whether or not it deserves to be called an “ideal” solution. It provides a brief historical
analysis of the birth of UNHCR’s mandate for voluntary repatriation, its evolution over
the past 45 years, as well as four case studies: the voluntary repatriation of Cambodian
refugees in 1980 and, again, in 1992 and 1993; of Iraqi (Kurdish) refugees in 1991; and
of Mozambican refugees (from Malawi) in 1993 to 1995.

This book served as a

framework for the explanation and analysis of UNHCR’s role in Guatemalan and Afghan
Repatriation.
The US Committee for refugees (an NGO) has published several publications on
the situation and statistics (qualitative and quantitative studies) of refugees around the
world. Its publication, El Retorno, describes into depth the risks Guatemalan returnees
confront and presents a contradicting perspective of UNHCR’s optimism. According to
the USCR, the vision of conflict resolution was far fetched. Despite the government’s
agreements to limit military power towards civilians, returnees found quite the opposite.
Conflict and ethnic differences are still present and threaten the Maya way of life. This
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publication will serve as additional analysis to the repatriation model employed in
Guatemala.
For further data on the case of Guatemalan refugees, Elizabeth Ferris has
published several works on Central American refugees and the conflicting policies they
have encountered. For example, Mexico has been known for generous asylum policies,
and feels an obligation to aid victims of violence from its neighboring countries.
However, Mexico’s own economic problems have caused ambiguous policies. In the US,
on the other hand, Ferris argues that Central American refugees are often deported and
their asylum application is commonly denied because of the fact that they choose not to
stay in Mexico. This demonstrated economic intentions and not political. Ferris also
discusses the many internal problems and pressure of the Mexican Commission for
Refugee Aid (COMAR) that provides aid and political representation.
Allan Burns, (1994) also provides anthropological study of the Guatemalan Maya
refugee population in Indian Town, Florida.

He includes interviews with refugees,

reports on the conditions they live in and opinions on the idea of repatriation (return to
Guatemala) for them. Overall he studies the cultural adaptation and “melting” pot of
cultures of this Diaspora in South Florida. Burns also analyses the US position on the
situation for refugees and concludes it is one of “interference and ignorance,” since it has
supported the Guatemalan government and even trained its army (since the overthrow of
Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in the 1950’s) and often does not recognize the Maya as
refugees, but as immigrants seeking economic betterment. The fact that most of their
family members were killed in ethnic violence “was not enough to prove persecution or
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to qualify for asylum.” Burns’ work will provide the perspective of repatriation for
Guatemalans in the US.
Commission for Historical Clarification has published Guatemala Memory of
Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, where it provides an
examination of the causes, origins and effect of the internal armed confrontation and on
more than 9,000 interviews. It presents the methods of the violence, its consequences
and effects. The conclusions are then presented and are followed by recommendations to
the United Nations.

The report provides historical clarification of the atrocities

committed in Guatemala by the National Army after the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz
Guzmán, and aims to promote an open dialogue of events. The commission therefore
pointed out the weakness of the Guatemalan government and strongly criticized North
American role in its support. The report also provides data on the proportion of people
killed in the civil war and the forces responsible for the human rights violations. This
analysis is essential to understand the pattern of genocide in Guatemala as well as the
actions taken to resolve and mend internal relationships, since the CEH has played an
active role in the supervision of mending relations.
For the case of Afghanistan’s background, I will refer to the work of Larry
Goodson in his book Afghanistan’s Endless War: State failure, Regional Politics and the
Rise of the Taliban. Goodson discusses the aftermath of the Cold War era and how
conflicts never ceased after this disruption. He also discussed in detail how historical
factors have shaped Afghan society and its destruction.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) has performed numerous
evaluations on the returnee situation in Afghanistan. It also addresses the limitations
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undergone by UNHCR due to the unexpected amount of returnees and the ongoing
pressure of its donors. They asses the focus of humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan
has focused in the immediate survival of returnees and has not taken into account that
state rebuilding is needed (and is often a pre-condition) for social stability. Within these
studies I found a clear explanation of how external factors led to the failure of UNHCR’s
strategy in Afghan repatriation.
UNHCR’s publications also provide an extensive collection of reports on the
repatriation patterns in Afghanistan. The framework of these patters is discussed into
detail as well as the impact in the local socio-economic aspects. These reports will serve
as a glance into the reported situation. However, for the purpose of this research, I
extended the image of the situation by providing a deeper analysis of the levels of
violence in each country of origin. To do so, I employed an empirical method of a
“violence indicator” as proposed by Gernot Kohler and Norman Alcock (1976). This
measurement provided a clear perspective for the conditions in the ground of each
country. The indicators are classified into two levels: Structural Violence and Behavioral
Violence. The first measured conditions that lower life expectancy due to the state’s
failure to protect citizens from life-threatening danger or from the lack of resources. The
latter indicates armed conflict. For the purpose of this research the same criteria will be
used to measure the conditions of each case at the time of repatriation until today.
For the gathering of this data, I have used statistical and demographical
information from The World Health Organization (WHO), since it provides country
reports on the deaths related to malnutrition, exposure or lack of resources for each
country. This helped account for structural violence. Along with the UNHCR field
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reports of the situation of repatriated areas, this has been a main source of measuring the
conditions at the country of origin.
Another source for the gathering of data reflecting the situation in the ground was
Marshal’s database of Political Violence (2005). Here, Marshal offers a comprehensive
account of every outbreak of political violence from 1946 to 2004. This data set includes
the nature of the conflict, dates, number of casualties, magnitude of the impact it had in
society and the states involved. This data accounted for the behavioral violence in the
country of repatriation.
Overall, existing research has gathered and evaluated numerical data on the
amount of refugees, the impact of forced migration for refugees and host countries, or the
causes of forced migration. As for the issue of reintegration, the data is limited to
briefing notes and situation reports by UNHCR field officials in particular regions of
interest to UNHCR. I have found no formal and inclusive analysis of the actual situation
of returnees after repatriation patterns took place that evaluates structural and behavioral
violence, thereby evaluating the safety of returnees and stability of the country.

Significance of my contribution

This study questions the methodology of repatriation and reintegration patterns,
and how human life is affected by the complexity of these situations. It will also question
the effectiveness of International Organizations’ role in conflict resolution and permanent
solutions such as repatriation.
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Previous literature discusses social, legal situation of refugees, or merely describe
the integration into their original or into a different society.

Publications by the

UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) describe how the process of
repatriation was carried out and provide a limited explanation of reintegration. These
studies exist for very few cases, including Guatemala, Rwanda and South East Asia.
These are concluded with suggestions for future repatriation models. However, I intend
to provide a comparative analysis of different regions and how the repatriation and
reintegration process remains today and its success rate. That is, to what extent and in
which circumstances has reintegration been a success? This study also provides an up to
date analysis of the returnee situation in the countries of origin.

Research Design

This thesis employs case studies of Guatemala and Afghanistan. I have employed
cross-regional case studies to test the hypotheses in diverse environments. These two
cases have similar situations in a cross-cultural setting that make these countries worth
analyzing. First, the origin of the conflict dates back to the Cold War period and they
have been argued to be pawns of Cold War strategies and foreign intervention that
disrupted each country’s stability and led to prolonged civil wars.10 Second, UNHCR has
carried out intensive and relatively successful repatriation strategies involving millions of
refugees from these three countries. Third, these three cases provide a regional
representation of some of the most severe (yet often neglected) cases of war and forced
migration in their region, since none of them received foreign intervention to prevent the
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conflict(s) that created the diasporas. Most importantly, all three cases involve a rural
population whose sustainable livelihoods were destroyed by extended civil war. At the
time of repatriation, these refugees found themselves with the similar situation: No
suitable land to resume their lifestyle as land laborers.
After extensive analysis of the strategy employed by UNHCR, it was found that
strategies proposed to follow fixed guidelines in both cases. Therefore, by using these
two cases, I will be controlling for the policy proposed.

In reality, the strategies

demonstrated to have disparity in the treatment of returnees despite the proposed actions
required by the UNHCR mandate for voluntary repatriation. In addition, both cases have
been categorized as a type “3 intensity” at their highest level of warfare according to the
Peace Research Institute of Norway.11 Therefore, both conflicts account for a similar
number of casualties and for a similar scale of violence. In summary, the study of these
two cases will maximize variation for the primary explanatory factor (which is the
condition in the ground of the country of origin) and will in turn minimize the variation
for the control variables (which are UNHCR strategies and type of conflict). This way, I
will be able to effectively evaluate the effect of the chosen strategies by UNHCR in
different conditions.
The thesis has five chapters, including this introduction. The second chapter will
discuss UNHCR’s Mandate in detail and provide examples of how it has fulfilled (or
failed to do so in certain instances) its goals for voluntary repatriation and reintegration.
It will also discuss the repatriation program employed in each case and a discussion of
their effectiveness. In both cases UNHCR employed strategies of mediation and peace
accords before commencing repatriation, monitoring human rights, providing education,
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medical attention and aiding the development of humane standards of living. All of these
steps and their effect on establishing a suitable environment for return will be analyzed.
The next two chapters (chapters 3 and 4) provide the analysis of the individual
cases. I address each case study in the same pattern. I briefly discuss cultural and social
issues that make the persecuted population different from the oppressors. I also address
the history of the conflict or persecution, foreign intervention, and consequences of the
conflict: number of casualties, number of internally and externally displaced. I briefly
address where the displaced population sought refuge, the patterns of intervention of
UNHCR and when applicable, of the cooperation with the local government and NGO’s.
Finally, the conditions in the ground after repatriation were evaluated based on the model
of measurement of violence by Gernot Kohler & Norman Alcock (1976). Violence is
seen as a key factor for the proper integration of returnees, since it determines the degree
of safety upon return.

This rate of violence was evaluated for each case and will

determined the ability (or lack of) for returnees to rebuild their homes and to achieve a
successful reintegration. Violence was main indicator for the condition in the ground and
was stratified according to Kholer and Alcock’s model of structural and behavioral
violence.
The equation for structural violence (as used by Kohler and Alcock) is as follows:
Pn
V =

Pn
-

En

C

Where Pn = Population of the sample (country)
En = Life Expectancy of the sample (country)
C = Egalitarian Life Expectancy
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V = Structural Violence

Despite variations in other literature in violence indicators, Kohler and Alcock’s
model is uncomplicated and broad enough to obtain the general grasp of life threatening
conditions that lower life expectancy in each country. I chose an egalitarian (or global)
value of life expectancy to have a common baseline of comparison at the international
level for the situation in these two countries. With this equation, a positive value of “V”
indicates a higher level of structural violence, while a negative value would indicate a
lower level when compared to the global standard. The Egalitarian life expectancy “C”
was obtained through previous investigations by WHO, where a “Health-Adjusted Life
Expectancy” (HALE) was obtained. HALE is based on life expectancy at birth but
includes an adjustment for time spent in poor health. It is most easily understood as the
equivalent number of years in full health that a newborn can expect to live based on
current rates of ill-health and mortality.12

Behavioral violence levels according to

previous quantification methods will also be used to picture the likelihood of stability,
since this will have a direct impact in the livelihood of returnees.
The last chapter will provide a summation of all the data found and conclusions
on the relationship of UNHCR’s strategy, today’s outcome of reintegration of former
refugees, and what leads to the failure of reintegration.

Conclusion
The findings of the repatriation and reintegration success rate ultimately relied in
the stability of the country of origin. On the other hand, stability in the country of origin
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relies on the success of conflict resolution and the establishing of peaceful relations
among citizens and government. Conflict resolution and an end to ethnic violence have
been recognized as a key components for the conditions of return according to UNHCR’s
mandate. Hence, without peace the success of reintegration is unlikely.
In general, I found varied results of reintegration success rate. Guatemala has
proven to be a more controlled project with the formation of the Comisión de
Escalrecimiento Histórico (CEH) as an agent of defense to victims and returnees and for
the clarification of events that took place in the civil war. With this agency in control,
Guatemala aimed for the reconstruction of relationships before opening its arms to
massive returnee movement.

Afghanistan on the other hand, commenced massive

repatriation without the insurance of socio-political stability. The equivalent of the CEH
in Afghanistan is the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), which has been
analyzing the degree of stability and sustainability after mass repatriation has taken place.
With the quantification of structural violence, it was clear that the difference in HealthAdjusted Life Expectancy in the two cases was quite different. Structural violence in
Afghanistan was significantly higher than in Guatemala. Therefore, the following thesis
was reached: The Afghan encashment program proved to be an ineffective way for
achieving reintegration, due to the lack of proper monitoring and insurance of stability
prior to repatriation. On the other hand, Guatemala’s “hands-on” escort and monitoring
programs were more appropriate ways of reintegrating returnees.
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CHAPTER II
UNHCR’s Mandate and Strategies
This chapter discusses the guidelines for voluntary repatriation as stated in
UNHCR’s mandate. For the focus of this research the analysis of the implementation
of these steps will be analyzed from the insurance of safety in terms of structural and
behavioral violence. In order to do so, I have pointed out the strategies that may or
may not have placed a risk for returnees. It is important to specify that strategies are
not necessarily a direct cause for detrimental conditions of returnees. The cause for
unsuccessful reintegration and stability may often be a result of unexpected or
unwanted developments. However, it was common to find lack of proper analysis
and prospects for the future before promoting and initiating mass returns.

UNHCR’s Mandate for Voluntary Repatriation
UNHCR seeks permanent solutions for refugees by assisting, host countries and
countries of origin (as well as NGO’s) to facilitate the movement and protection of
returnees. This is, of course, in the case that the UNHCR deems the conditions in the
ground as “suitable” and “safe” for return. One critical condition for return is for it to
be voluntary, and the entities participating have a role of facilitating and promoting a
safe return. The personal decision to return therefore implies there is no longer fear
of persecution in the country of origin. Involuntary repatriation (or Deportation) to
unsafe areas is prohibited in UNHCR’s mandate.
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The mandate also states UNHCR will only promote voluntary repatriation if the
country of origin agrees of the active role of UNHCR in the repatriation process. The
“active role” consists of the following activities:
1. Establishing and ensuring the voluntary nature of the return
2. Promoting governments’ assistance and involvement in the process
3. Establishing the assurance of conflict resolution
4. Education among the refugee population of the current conditions at the country
of origin
5. Constant monitoring of the return process and the results
6. Assistance in the reintegration process.

Aid could be monetary, material or

political and will include the funding and organization of transportation and
establishment for returnees.
The insurance of safety and security, as discussed by the mandate, includes the
full acceptance of the returnees by the National Authorities, full restoration of their
rights and the equal access to physical security (which mean physical protection from
armed conflict or remaining landmines), material security (to be able to have
sustainable livelihoods), and the eradication of all discrimination.
In summary, the role UNHCR plays in voluntary repatriation is ideally one of
seeking permanent solutions, promotion and facilitation of return. For the promotion
of solutions, UNHCR follows certain criteria:
1. Aim to resolve the root causes of the forced migration with national, regional and
international efforts.
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2. Creating a humanitarian, non-political space that will engage in peaceful dialogue
for the resolution of the root causes.
3. Consultation and involvement of the refugee population in the decision-making
process, thereby making them an active part of the process
4. The will of the country of origin must be followed.
5. The cooperation of the international community to promote the conditions of
return must be achieved.
In addition, the promotion of repatriation must have the following essential
pre-conditions:
1. Voluntary character
2. A general improvement of the situation of the country of origin
3. Formal guarantee (i.e. Agreement, Treaty…) of the country of origin’s
improvement for the a safe return and integration
4. UNHCR’s complete access to refugees and returnees
5. The terms and conditions of return must be fully discussed in a formal
repatriation agreement between UNHCR and the country of origin.

Recently, UNHCR has modified its repatriation tactics into more stratified
procedures. The Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities (2003) offers
seven modules to be employed in each situation, each of them with a different approach
according to the country’s or the refugees’ needs. Even though no repatriation model has
been organized using these new modules, these are meant to be courses of action for
future. The modules include detailed examples of what previous models might teach us
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for the future. For instance, modules 2 and 3 make reference to examples of the case of
Afghanistan, and certain policies employed have provided the framework for new and
improved approaches for future repatriation planning.
In theory, the involvement of UNHCR in the repatriation and reintegration process
present the ideal approach to benefit refugees who want to return. On the other hand, the
reality of these two cases may at times suggest otherwise due to socio-political and
economic limitations.

Afghanistan
The movement of refugees to host countries such as Pakistan and Iran began in 1978,
after the Saur Revolution. Today, movement along the borders in search for safety and
employment is still frequent.

In 1988 a Bilateral Agreement was signed between

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Later, agreements were made between the UN, Afghanistan
and Pakistan that ensured the voluntary nature of the return and defined the general
characteristics of the assistance that would be provided to returnees.13 This repatriation
agreement is still effective and will end by the Summer of 2006. In Iran, the agreement
ended May 2005 and due to a larger integration of refugees into Iranian society,
repatriation has not reached a massive scale.14

Over 700,000 Afghans returned home

from Iran and Pakistan during the first nine months of 2004 alone. The total number of
returns since March 2002 has reached over 3.5 million.
Strategies in Afghan repatriation were initiated with the assumption that the
necessary pre-conditions mentioned above were achieved. However, Afghanistan has
been living a lifestyle where the use of force and violence was the way to solve disputes
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and assertion of power.15 These patterns have been nearly impossible to eradicate in
Afghan society, especially with the US’s reinforcement of the “warlord strategy” to
combat the Taliban and its supporters.

Unfortunately, the US led intervention has

unveiled a problem when trying to eradicate another one. With the reinforcement of the
warlord regime, peace, stability and the monitoring of human rights have been and will
continue to be difficult according to Human Rights Watch. In addition, the Taliban has
shown a significant wave of insurrection even at the time of repatriation.

The

cooperation of the international community has proven to be one of the most difficult
tasks in Afghanistan, since despite efforts of the Bonn Agreement signed in December
2001 neighboring countries have continued to support the Taliban.
The complete access to returnees by the UNHCR also proved to be impossible in
Afghanistan due to the vast amount of movement along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
Keeping track of returnees was not properly accomplished with the Encashment Program
of Return in Pakistan after the end of Soviet occupation. The encashment was often a
grant of US $100.00 and 300 kilograms of wheat to cover expenses and nutrition for the
trip back to Afghanistan. At times, due to economic restraints, the cash grant was
lowered to $30.00 USD. This did not ensure the actual return or the time of return. After
the grant, there was a “deregistration” of the refugee and the end of assistance, thereby
offering an apparently cost effective method of promoting repatriation.
Refugees who took the encashment grant either remained in Pakistan after taking the
cash and food or attempted to return to Afghanistan.

Some of the returnees often

returned to Pakistan due to the lack of establishing sustainable livelihoods and because a
high level of socio-political instability.16 Without the proper monitoring, hardship is even
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more intense.

Once they had been deregistered, refugees had no protection from

UNHCR and became clandestine immigrants in Pakistan. Clandestine communities have
been tolerated in Pakistan, yet refugees often have no access to employment, health or
education.17

Therefore, the encashment strategy has not only adversely affected

returnees, but also the refugees living at the host countries. By 1988, conditions in
Afghanistan were not safe enough for the food distribution and the ongoing drought made
subsistence farming impossible. Hence, the notorious pattern of “recyclers” began a
cycle that would create a barrier for further improvement of the management of
repatriation programs. The recycling of UNHCR repatriation packages led to stricter and
costly screening processes to avoid the misuse of the system. For instance, in some
encashment centers today, iris-screening tests are implemented to make sure refugees
have not received assistance previously.18
An evaluation of UNHCR’s encashment program employed in Afghanistan argues it
will aid refugees who voluntarily want to return even when conditions are not favorable.
In the case of Afghanistan however, the fact that refugees in Pakistan often had no source
of income made the encashment a source of “fast cash” and food. Policy evaluation also
stresses out the advantages of reinforcing individual decision-making among refugees.19
However, among the active roles assigned to the UNHCR, a constant monitoring of the
return process and the results is difficult (if not impossible) with the encashment
program. Attempts for a better monitoring of repatriation has been directed to avoid
recyclers and not to assess the situation in Afghanistan nor to insure proper reintegration.
The complete destruction of the country’s infrastructure and private homes meant
returnees were coming back to be homeless and to have no facilities for healthcare or
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education for children. To respond to this serious issue, UNHCR and Afghan authorities
build 100,000 shelters that housed 1.5 million returnees. In 2004, 22 million (USD) were
assigned for the construction of 20,500 more shelters.

To fight the poverty issue,

UNHCR has also organized local “cash for work” programs where returnees were paid
for construction labor of the shelters.20
A strategy for reintegration that proved to be successful was the “cash-for-work”
program. For instance, with the repatriation package, refugees often received woven
blankets done by returnees themselves and purchased by the UNHCR to be given out to
future returnees. This not only generated employment and cash flow among returnees,
but it also integrated them into the economy. Multi fuel stoves were also manufactured
and sold by returnees and provided to those who were to return.21
Despite the recognition of lack of security and the intensification of hostility towards
electoral, governmental and humanitarian workers, the plans for repatriation are still
present. With the past limitations and setbacks, UNHCR has reinvented the course of
action for this year. Within its publication for Global Appeal for 2005,
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it presents a

proposal for the course of action for future repatriations. They propose deeper protection
and monitoring of refugees by strengthening relations with the Afghan Independent
Human Rights Commission, NGO’s and other UN groups.

They also propose the

training of law enforcers in refugee and human rights to avoid future occurrence of
gender-based violence. Encashment strategies will still be employed, with limitations to
the most needy individuals. UNHCR states in the report it plans on reducing the material
and monetary aid and replacing it for a protection-oriented program by offering more
legal aid centers for refugees and asylum seekers, and establishing networks to promote
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the advocacy of refugee protection.

Access to proper health care, clean water and

children’s education will remain a priority for 2005. Also, there will be an emphasis on
the promotion of empowerment strategies that will encourage deeper self-sufficiency of
individuals. As seen in the proposed budget, the two activities with higher funding are
protection, monitoring and coordination and health:
Budget, 2005 (USD)
Activities and Services
Annual Program
Protection, monitoring and coordination
9,055,754
Community services
454,322
Domestic needs
434,873
Education
3,452,947
Food
39,332
Health
4,501,940
Legal assistance
1,616,191
Operational support (to agencies)
1,425,989
Sanitation
138,222
Transport/logistics
284,471
Water (non-agricultural)
568,513
Total Operations
21,972,554
Program support
2,498,161
Total
24,470,715
Proposed budget for activities in Afghan repatriation
Source: UNHCR Global Appeal 2005
Allocations of these funds are limited to UNHCR and do not include budget from
other NGO’s and International Organizations. For instance, UN World food program has
projected 168.3 million (USD) will be assigned to Afghanistan this year.23
In Iran there is clearly a smaller population of Afghan refugees. As mentioned
earlier, repatriation from Iran has also been less numerous since refugees were highly
integrated in Iranian labor and society. In addition, the absence of camps has caused the
refugee population to spread thought Iran in search of employment and well-being.
However, due to the increasing pressure of governmental policies aimed to restrict further
Afghan integration, UNHCR has had to increase its repatriation efforts in the country.
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Shelters will also be reduced to 10,000 units and reserved for the most vulnerable
populations.24

UNHCR will also promote the return of professionals that had fled

Afghanistan, thereby trying to reverse the problems caused by the country’s “brain
drain.” It also proposes to increase the cash-for-work programs and to promote incomegenerating activities that include all women and men.
In Islamabad, Pakistan plans stand for the shutting down of all the refugee camps
inside the western tribal belt, the area along Afghanistan’s borders. Recent reports for
June 2005 state that around 83% of camp residents in Waziristan have chosen to
repatriate after a series of military invasions and harassment by Pakistani authorities in
mid-2004 in search for extremist terrorist organizations. Unto this pressure, UNHCR has
agreed to promote either the relocation or the repatriation of refugees from camps along
this region.

Guatemala
The first attempt for repatriation in Guatemala took place in 1986 as an initiative
of the Guatemalan government and monitored by the army. However, this movement
turned out to be a strategy from the army to keep the population under direct control and
to suppress insurrection and political activism. A second attempt was made. This time,
the exiled at Mexico and the Guatemalan government negotiated a unified movement of
returnees at with the requests and conditions of refugees themselves.

Here, the

Guatemalan government and refugees took the first few steps for mending relations.
UNHCR intervened in 1993, where unlike the case of Afghanistan, transportation
from the host country to the country of origin was provided (not just promoted) by
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UNHCR. The returnees were also accompanied by health workers and foreign observers
and escorted to their new settlement by Guatemalan government officials, UNHCR, the
Red Cross and the Comisiones Permanentes (representatives of refugees).25 UNHCR
was also directly involved in community training programs that included vocational
studies, and awareness of the aftermath of war (such as land mine awareness). Within the
communities, women’s integration has received strong emphasis as one of UNHCR’s
main goals. However, at the time of the first repatriation wave, many argued the political
climate in Guatemala was suitable for flight rather than return. Human rights abuses
were still present at the time of repatriation.
In order to watch over the security in the region, UNHCR assigned officers to the
repatriated areas to file reports of the situation. For example, Roberto Mignone reported
the returnee situation at Cuarto Pueblo, where refugees were back to restore their land.
Thanks to the UNHCR and CECI of Canada, small farming projects have been
established. Mignone reports of the cheerful fiestas in the village and how happy the
population seems to be despite incidents of still un-detonated land mines posing a threat
to the communities.
The evaluation and policy analysis center for UNHCR presents limitations
undergone by the Guatemala operation. Paula Worby argues the constant change in
management personnel presented obstacles when properly addressing the problems that
needed to be solved. On the other hand, frequent and prolonged visits (and reports) from
UNHCR officials to repatriated areas ensured UHNCR was fully informed of the
situations.
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Strategies in Guatemala focused on protection and were grouped into three main
categories. The use of mediation and newly established commissions to ease conflicts
and differences between returnees and the government and/or their other Guatemalan
cittizens in part as a strategy of prevention against future displacements;
1. Promotion of the exercise of other basic civil rights through personal and land
documentation;
2. Prevention of human rights violations, monitoring of human rights cases and
subsequent follow-up;
3. Prevention of human rights violations, monitoring of human rights cases and
subsequent follow-up.
With the establishment of the Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH, or
“Truth Commission”) in 1994, historical investigation of Guatemala’s war has changed
the face of reconciliation. As CEH’s main purpose, it has broken with the patterns of
silence and fear of former victims and empowered them to speak out and mobilize
themselves. According to CEH, this is the first and most important step for true
reconciliation of Guatemalan society. It has offered thousands of Guatemalans an
opportunity to denounce the abuses they had suffered and the forensic anthropologists
have allowed families to give decent burials to their loved ones. Together, the two efforts
have provided overwhelming proof regarding the scope and nature of the killing that took
place. The local rights groups, meanwhile, have had a few significant court victories and,
in the process, have done more than anyone to make Guatemala's justice system begin to
fulfill its function as the guarantor of human rights.
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CHAPTER III
Afghanistan

Introduction
Afghanistan has been devastated with 23 years of war and over 5 years of a
drought that makes the establishment of sustainable lives virtually impossible, especially
for the rural population. Nonetheless, UNHCR has been overwhelmed with the vast
amount of returnees. For such a massive return, researchers and scholars have questioned
why these refugees returned. Extensive investigation from Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit (AREU) has explained why would refugees return to such instability and
poverty. They conclude the main reasons for return were the following:
•

The wish to return home due to negative experiences in exile.

•

Assistance package given by UNHCR was a form of income. This promoted
what they call “recyclers”, or people who claimed to want to return, collected
the assistance, went to Afghanistan and returned to the host country.

•

Expectations were too optimistic. Aid was promised for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan and there was a promise of stability re-enforced by an
international military presence.

•

Pressure and harassment were common at the countries of asylum, especially
in Pakistan.

Overall, the acceptance of refugees was a religious and

humanitarian action; not a legal obligation.
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The main problem plaguing the repatriation and reintegration pattern in
Afghanistan has been the vast amount of returnees for a small budget. The promised
international aid did not arrive at the expected time or never arrived at all. In addition,
donors were mainly interested in the mere survival of returnees, not on state re-building.
This proved to be a flawed approach, since stability and the assurance of security are
essential for the reintegration of returnees. Consequently, UNHCR saw itself failing to
comply with is own mandate.
On the other hand, a massive-scale return had several implications for the
international community. First, it gave the Afghan government a vote of confidence and
an unfounded pretense of stability. It also justified the intervention for the overthrow of
the Taliban and gave a deeper sense of validity to the international organizations
involved. For the host countries (mostly Pakistan and Iran), Afghan repatriation meant a
reduction of the “economic burden” refugees represented. Therefore, mass repatriation
increased at a rate that would destabilize Afghan society.
As in the case of Guatemala, the distinction between economic migrants and
refugees is a thin line that is often crossed. Nonetheless, Afghanistan’s ongoing drought
and the aftermath of 23 years of war left the agricultural sector in ruins and the rural
population was consequently unable to make a living once they returned. This has
created an ongoing dilemma in the classification of who is a refugee and who is an
economic migrant.
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Historical Background26
Afghan history has been shaped according to its location. It lies in the route
between India, Iran and serves as the gateway to central Asia. Afghan rugged terrains
isolate tribal unities, thereby creating a diverse cultural affinity and hindering national
unity. As travelers passed through the region, urban centers began to emerge. The region
Afghanistan was then conquered by the Persian King Darius I and later by Alexander the
Great on his way to India. After Alexander’s death, the region went from dynasty to
dynasty. This period also brought religious diversity. Buddhism was introduced in the
2nd Century B.C. Islamic conquests began in the 7th Century and marked the beginning of
unity efforts that today make up most of the Afghan state. Afghans had received the
name of “Durranis”, a term that is still used today.
Emir Dost Muhammad came to power in 1826 as a strong and prominent leader,
yet soon encountered problems with foreign influence.

The British, in hopes of

controlling the route to India, tried to replace him with a former Emir who was supportive
of British motives and policies. This intervention led to the Afghan War from 1838 to
1842. Despite the temporary overthrow of Dost Muhammad, rebel groups in Kabul
helped restore the existing government. An alliance was later signed with the British.
Another foreign intervention was from Russians who claimed portions of northern
Afghanistan. This and more territorial disputes with the British led to a second war in
Afghanistan in 1878. Border agreements were later negotiated with Russia, Persia and
British India.

However, with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, Afghan

independence was granted with the condition that Britain would have control on foreign
affairs. In 1919, Emir Amanullah attempted to break with British influence and invaded
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India. This was known as the third Afghan War and the outcome granted Afghanistan
full control of its foreign affairs.
Amanullah also attempted the modernization of Afghanistan by adopting western
ideals.

He reduced the influence of religious leaders in governmental affairs and

increased freedom for women. This motivated opposition among tribes and eventually
led to his removal in 1929. Power was briefly taken by a tribal leader but was later
defeated by Amanullah’s cousin, Muhammad Nadir Khan who was proclaimed Shah.
Afghanistan was affected by a drought and severe economic hardship. As a
consequence, a group of young militants accused King Muhammad Zahir Khan of
mishandling the economy. This group then proclaimed a republic with Lt. Muhammed
Dahud Khan in power. In 1978 he was ousted and a Marxist regime was established with
close ties to the USSR. However, in 1979, the head of state was killed and the regime
toppled, hence the developing of the Afghanistan War (1979 to 1989). The USSR
consequently invaded and a Soviet-supported president was put into power. During this
time, the Mujahidin guerrilla movement, or “Islamic warriors” were an avid opposition to
the soviet forces and to their supporters. This made them a strategic group for the Cold
War politics of the time and for the weakening of the Soviet Union. As a consequence,
the Mujahidin were supported by aid from US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. They
gained full control of the rugged mountains and rural areas. The Soviets on the other
hand initially had control of the urban sectors. Despite Afghan victory, the war took an
enormous toll on the economy, human life and overall, caused a wave of massive human
displacement. Over 1 million Afghans died and 5 million sought refuge in neighboring
countries - mainly Pakistan and Iran. At the time, over 2% of the county was covered in
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landmines, thereby making it difficult for civilians to return to their homes.

Also,

guerrilla forces were not able to properly unite for the nation's reconstruction.
Afghanistan therefore became a patchwork of individually ruled areas that constantly
opposed the newly established government under Burhanuddin Rabbani. This created the
favorable panorama for the rise of the Taliban regime a militia of Pashtun Islamic
fundamentalists.
In 1994 the Taliban gained power. By 1996, a power-sharing accord was signed.
However, the Taliban intervened militarily, taking control of Kabul and proclaimed the
"Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan", imposing fundamentalist and extremely restrictive
laws. Internal conflict continued, as the Taliban enforced authoritarian laws that made
Fundamental Islam an absolute power. Despite UN's economic sanctions and the lack of
international recognition as a legitimate power, the Taliban continued to gain control. By
then, constant warfare and drought brought dire conditions to Afghanistan.
Post 9/11, the U.S. developed interest in Afghanistan, since Bin Laden was
thought to be hiding here. The US demanded the surrender of Bin Laden, yet the Taliban
refused to hand him over. Several thousand U.S. troops began entering the country in
November, mainly to concentrate on the search for bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah
Muhammad Omar and to deal with the remaining pockets of their forces. Additionally, a
clandestine opposition to the Taliban known as the Northern Alliance, with the help of
U.S. air support, took over successfully the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul. On
December 7, the Taliban regime fell, and its troops fled their last stronghold, Kandahar.
However, al-Qaeda members and other Mujahideen who had earlier fought with and
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supported the Taliban continued to fight for the control of Afghanistan. This forced U.S.
and allied troops to remain in Afghanistan.
In June 2002, Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun (the dominant ethnic group in the country)
became president and a multiparty republic replaced an interim government that had been
established in Dec. 2001. The U.S. and NATO maintained troops to combat the remnants
of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. However, attacks on American-led forces intensified since
the war, and warlords continued to have regional control. In a highly aggressive and
uncharacteristic move, Karzai attempted to restraint one of the most powerful warlords,
Ismail Khan, by removing him from Herat, a western province, in 2004. Violent protests
followed Khan's ouster.
By October of 2004, Afghanistan held its first democratic elections for president.
Former king Muhammad Zarzai Khan had returned from exile to lead the interim
government and was later elected as president. Opposition was still a treat. In fact, his
vice president was assassinated and an attempt was done to kill the newly elected
president. However, there has been a relative stabilization on the region, and UNHCR
has estimated that over 3 million Afghan refugees have voluntarily returned to their
hometown to rebuild Afghanistan. Reconstruction has been slowly progressing; therefore
it is difficult to control rural areas. In January of 2004, a new constitution was passed
that grants rights to minority groups. However, tensions continue among the Pashtun
majority and other ethnic groups
The country itself largely reverted to the control of the regional warlords who
held power before the Taliban. Therefore, a strong central government is still in
formation and not in control. Britain, Canada, and other NATO nations provided forces
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for various military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Other nations also
agreed to contribute humanitarian aid. The United Nations estimated that $28.5 billion
would be needed over the next years to effectively rebuild Afghanistan, yet this amount
has not been gathered.
Today, security in Afghanistan remains questionable. Human rights abuses have
continued with a high concentration in most of the northern region. There is also a high
incidence of illegal taxation, occupation of land and discrimination against minority
groups. In addition, returnees in the northern rural region have no property and often
cannot sustain their families.27

Afghan Social structure 28
Afghanistan's history of the last years has been a history of war and devastation.
The country's ancient culture, the treasures of the past, (which still exist despite the
destruction caused by the Taliban), were almost forgotten. Social life also was badly
affected; only very slowly can Afghanistan re-discover its own identity, which never
resembled the Taliban's fundamentalism.29
According to Valentine Moghadam (1993) modernization and women’s rights in
Afghanistan has depended on two factors: the patriarchal nature of society and a weak
central State. A strong state has the ability of influencing society, regulating social
relations and resources. Afghanistan has not been able to do any of this due to the strong
ties and loyalty to the local tribal culture and because of the geographical boundaries that
made communication and human contact difficult. The government under the monarchy
often called for modernization and especially for women’s rights that failed.
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Afghanistan’s pre-Taliban society was commonly fragmented into tribes (Gablia)
or communal groups (Gawm).

Therefore, ethnic, religious and tribal divisions

maintained local independence and often showed reluctance towards a central
government. Geography helps isolate these communities and consolidate differences,
since the rugged terrain has made it costly and hard for communications between central
government and tribes. Among the 5 most prominent groups are the Pashtuns (which are
the majority), Persian speaking Tajiks, the Hazaras, the Uzbeks and the Baluchs.30 Urban
sectors were formed as facilitators of transit for trade, and markets among local tribes
were not integrated. Therefore, there was a lack of formation of a central national
economy. Nationalism and the concept of Nation-State are absent within most of the
population. As a consequence, modernizing attempts had ended up in tribal rebellion
towards center authority.
The Pre-Taliban regime was also characterized by foreign intrusion, since
Afghanistan was a pawn of the former USSR and US cold war. Despite a truce in
February 1989, the pro-Soviet government of President Najibullah was left in charge. By
mid-April 1992 Najibullah was overthrown and Islamic rebels advanced on the capital.
Different rebel groups began fighting one another for control. In the middle of the chaos
of competing factions, the Taliban (consisting of Islamic students) seized control of
Kabul in September 1996. This take-over completely disrupted Afghan way of life by
imposing unwanted and severe fundamentalist laws (including stoning for adultery and
severing hands for theft). Women were banned from the work force and from school.
They were also required to cover themselves from head to foot in public. By fall 1998,
the Taliban controlled about 90% of the country and, with its devastating tactics and
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human rights abuses, had turned itself into an international exile. Only three countries,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, recognized the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate
government.31

The Refugee Population
Afghan refugees account for the largest population of interest for the UNHCR,
due to the massive number of displaced people – internally and externally. UNHCR’s
statistical report (2004) estimated over 2,136,000 from 1994 to 2003, therefore
accounting for the largest group of refugees in recent history.
Origin of major refugee populations in
2003 (ten largest groups)
Afghanistan
2,136,000
Sudan
606,200
Burundi
531,600
DR Congo
453,400
Palestinians
427,900
Somalia
402,200
Iraq
368,500
Viet Nam
363,200
Liberia
353,300
Angola
329,600
Origin of major refugee populations in 2003 (ten largest groups)
Source: UNHCR Statistical Report, 2004
Just like Afghan culture is not uniform, neither has been the refugee population.
Pashtuns composed 80% of refugees in Pakistan. In Pakistani camps, there was higher
health care than in the war-torn Afghanistan. Families averaged from 8 to 9 members. In
Afghanistan they averaged 6 due to a higher mortality rate among children.32

37

In Pakistan, men at times integrate into the local work force, while women remain
in camps. Seclusion of women is related to “honor” and preservation of personal identity
in the presence of external pressure. This was mostly due to the religious environment in
Pakistan that intensified the pre-existing Afghan patriarchal society. Consequently, men
received most of the food and women were likely to be malnourished and depended on
charity.33 Therefore UN World Food Program had an unintended unequal distribution.
UNHCR also encountered resistance of health care towards women. Depression and
mental instability in women was common due to experiences lived. They are prone to
hate towards men and low expectations of the world. In addition, the limited amount of
education girls received encouraged more gender inferiority.34
On the other hand, there has also been a sense of dislike to the Afghan population
within Pakistani society, which has contributed to disparities in political asylum policies.
The local shortage of employment often makes Pakistanis argue that Afghan immigrants
are overtaking the local labor.35

In addition, access to public services or legal

representation was limited. For instance in some camps, refugees were required to
contribute financially to maintain their own schools, water supply and health services.36
Pressure from local authorities have also played an influential role in the rate of
repatriation of Afghans. As quoted from a report from the Reuters foundation, the head
of the political administration in North Waziristan, (the region along the PakistaniAfghan border) Tariq Hayat, stated all Afghans – whether in camps or within all of
Pakistan would have to leave eventually.37 In addition, by mid-2004, a series of military
interventions took place in Waziristan by Pakistani forces that were searching for Islamic
militants, suspected to be Al-Qaeda militants. The conflict left behind hundreds of
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casualties.38 This led to the displacement of over 20,000 refugees, where most of them
returned to Afghanistan.39 Statements and actions like these make Afghans unwelcome
and harassed, thereby increasing the likelihood of repatriation despite the unsafe
conditions in Afghanistan. Unto this pressure, UNHCR has agreed to promote either the
relocation or the repatriation of refugees from camps along this region.
In Iran, refugees were not required to settle in camps; they could live where they
found work, thereby integrating into local society. They also shared a common language
(Dari) and religion (Shia Islam). Like Iranian citizens, they also had access to healthcare,
basic education and subsidized food.

There were however, restrictions on physical

movement, since permits were required for travel within the country. This integration to
Iranian society has led for a smaller number in repatriation in comparison to Pakistan.40
(See Figure 2)
Repatriation from Iran has also been less numerous since refugees were highly
integrated in Iranian labor and society. One key factor that has made the number of
returnees from Pakistan greater has been the weak surveillance along the borders.41 In
addition, the absence of camps in Iran has caused the refugee population to spread
thought Iran in search of employment and well-being. However, due to the increasing
pressure of governmental policies aimed to restrict further Afghan integration, UNHCR
has had to increase its repatriation efforts in the country. Examples of these policies have
been the increasing restriction for Afghan labor and work permits, reduction of access to
health centers and fees for education services.42
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Repatriation
Over 3.5 million Afghans have voluntarily repatriated since 2001, when an
apparent political and socio-economic stability was announced.

For a brief time,

repatriation movements were detained after increasing violence towards humanitarian
workers in Afghanistan led to the assassination of a UNHCR official. Repatriation
resumed when additional security for UNHCR officials was ensured and agreements
ensuring safety were reached with the government.43 This incident demonstrated high
levels of violence were still present at the time of repatriation.
Since the beginning of these repatriation patterns, UNHCR has served as an
arbitrary assistant and observer for the millions displaced because of war. Repatriation
and reintegration in Afghanistan is restricted to massive movement of returnees and this
implies the rebuilding of one's life and the reformation of a nation. It has been argued
this implication is the key reason for the pressure from outside donors. The “assurance”
of Afghan reformation justifies US and coalition intervention as “successful”. As a
result, encouraging messages of repatriation have been misleading refugees into high
expectations of the current situation.44 The shortage of housing and the destruction of the
pre-existing ones have led to the building of over 100,000 temporary shelters that host
over 500,000 returnees. Later, in 2004, UNHCR allocated $22 million to finance the
construction of 20,500 new shelters.
Rural Afghan areas are prone to higher unemployment rates (thereby poverty)
than in the cities. UNHCR has also worked with the central government to make sure
most areas have a "cash for work" employment program as well as vocational programs
to help returnees' reintegration in Afghan society. Although there have been signs of a
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movement for stability, some areas remain uncertain and unaccounted for. This is an
obstacle for the remaining refugees at the host countries, mostly Pakistan and Iran, to
repatriate.

Therefore, further measures for the well being of refugees include

negotiations with host countries for permanent solutions for refugees who choose not to
return to Afghanistan. In the case of future voluntary repatriations, UNHCR encourages
tri-partite agreements among the host country, Afghanistan and UNHCR.45
UNHCR’s aim for repatriation implies durable solutions to conflicts in the
country of origin as well as the reassurance of reintegration. This of course, depends on
the conditions on the ground: whether or not there is a degree of political and socioeconomic stability. Therefore, UNHCR’s methods and policies for repatriation depend
entirely on the nature and pace of such stability.46 In the case that UNHCR deems the
condition in the ground as suitable for repatriation, it will proceed with the organization
of return and development programs. In accordance with its mandate, UNHCR should
focus on protection and solutions. In the case of Afghanistan, it focuses and promotes
agreements between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, the focus on the planning
itself has often neglected monitoring of the situation of returnees. By not having a clear
understanding of the consequences of return UNHCR is restrained from fulfilling its legal
task for the returnees.47 A common cause for criticism for UNHCR’s involvement has
been the dire conditions to which refugees return. According to UNHCR evaluations,
Afghans who decide to return will do so with or without UNHCR’s help.48 The agency
therefore serves as a mediator and facilitator for those who decide to repatriate.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, repatriation strategies have recently acquired a
stratification of approaches to be followed. In the cases discussed in this work, strategies
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have been devised for each situation and each population’s needs. In the case of Afghan
repatriation from Iran included a tripartite agreement signed in 2002. UNHCR deals
directly with the Iranian immigration authority (BAFIA) that accounts for refugees and
transports them to the border. UNHCR performs interviews insuring that the repatriation
is voluntary and supervises transportation of returnees.
With the case of Afghan refugees in Iran, there are two mainstreams of movement
for repatriation. Those who have considerable resources and solid economic standing
have the means to take this risk. These often do not go to the UNHCR for help in the
return process, and often have less problems when rebuilding their lives and acquiring
sustainable livelihoods. On the other hand, there is the group with hardly any resources
who have little to lose by going home. Members of both groups have already started to
return and sometimes see themselves returning to Iran.49

Another tendency among

refugees in Iran has been integration, since many enjoy economic stability and therefore
do not deem repatriation as a rational choice. Also, the uncertainty of what to expect in
Afghanistan provokes a restrained attitude towards return.

Peace-building attempts & their results
In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement settled for an interim power sharing
arrangement, the creation of a new constitution, and elections in 2004. It also set an
agenda for security, peace process, establishment of peace-building institutions in
Afghanistan and the watch for human rights. For example, the Afghan Transitional
Authority (ATA) in June 2002 provided a framework for a sustained peace-building
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process in Afghanistan, assisted by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
(UNAMA).
There were limitations to the Bonn Agreement. For example, it did not include
agreements with neighboring countries that provided aid to Afghan military factions.
Therefore, the remnants of Al-Qaida and the Taliban remained supported and active.
Also, the damage made by the Taliban regime was overwhelming. The parliament,
courts, schools and health centers had been destroyed, and land mines are still present in
random areas.
rebuild.

Infrastructure was virtually non-existent and it would take years to

Additionally, the establishment of a unified and civilian political culture was

essential for the elements of the Bonn Agreement to be effective. Given the previous
pattern of fragmentation and the lack of a strong central government in Afghanistan, the
Bonn Agreement proved to be insufficient.
When the US-led invasion of Afghanistan began, despite the removal of the
Taliban regime, a consequence was the empowerment of warlords. This empowerment
made the Afghan Transitional Administration’s aim of establishing a civilian government
nearly impossible as well as the eradication of arms. With warlords, loyalty is once again
dedicated to the region; not to the national leaders and institutions. Therefore, warlords
now represent the primary threat to peace and stability in the country as well as to Human
Rights monitoring. In Kabul, the monitoring of the situation has been easier due to the
absence of warlord-ruled regions. Therefore, International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) and the heavy international presence has been possible in the capital. The rural
areas however, remain under warlord influence. Here, U.N. officials often have little
ability to protect persons at risk of human rights abuses. Vulnerable women and
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minorities, displaced persons and even Afghan government officials have virtually no one
to turn to when their lives or safety are threatened.50
The new constitution grants political rights for women such as equal rights and
duties under law. Also ¼ of the seats in the lower house of parliament (the Wolesi Jirga)
are reserved for women. At the upper house (Meshrano Jirga), 1/6 is reserved for
women as well. In the practice, however, social expectations of the role of women and
the conservative social nature make it difficult for women to be active in politics.
According to reports by Human Rights Watch and The World Today, female aid
workers, government officials, and journalists face harassment, violent attacks, and death
threats. Those who challenge the powerful, conservative elements of the country’s
political structures are targeted because they can be made into chilling examples for other
women considering political activity.51

Economy in Afghanistan Today
With agriculture as the main economic activity, Afghanistan has been adversely
affected with the constant warfare and drought. Fields were turned into war zones and
some remain with landmines today, thereby reducing the possibility of farmland
development. Subsistence crops include wheat and other grains, cotton, sugar beets,
fruits, and nuts. However, Afghan farmers have resorted to the illegal cultivation of
opium since it provides a higher pay.
especially sheep due to their wool.

Livestock is also essential in the economy;
The textile industry relies in the independent

production of hand-woven carpets. Despite limitations, the flow of foreign aid has
significantly improved economic development, especially within the agrarian sector.
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However, Afghanistan’s standards of living remain low, unemployment high and there is
a lack of basic necessities that will be discussed in a latter section of this chapter. These
necessities include housing, education, jobs and proper medical attention.52

Findings
Structural Violence
According to the World Health organization, Afghanistan's health status is among
the lowest in the world. In the year 2003 alone, 591,441 died of malaria, while 10,489
died of tuberculosis. (This accounts for the reported cases only and for the most common
incestuous diseases) The population with access to safe drinking water is of a mere 24%.
In addition to Afghanistan's drought problem, the lack of access to clean water accounts
for various health hazards.53
Indicators of coverage with primary health care
Population with access to safe drinking water (%)
Population with adequate excreta disposal facilities (%)
Pregnant women attended by trained personnel (%)
Deliveries attended by trained personnel (%)
Married women (15-49) using contraceptives (%)
Indicators of coverage with primary health care
*Source: WHO, 2003

24
12
16
14
10

1999
1998
2003
2003
2003

The data for the evaluation of structural violence had to be limited to the data
gathered in 2004 for the year 2003, since WHO does not have the HALE figures for an
egalitarian (or worldwide) value for more recent years. Therefore, for the results to be
consistent with the same time frame, the value of life expectancy used in the equation
was for the year 2003. The average life expectancy for males and females worldwide is
of 59.3. Afghanistan accounts for the one of lowest life expectancies in the world (35.5).
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Afghanistan’s population for 2003 is of 23,897,00. When applying this data to the
equation for structural violence, the value V = 270,170.1.

Behavioral (Armed) Violence
In a series of Armed conflict datasets, Wallensteen, Peter et al. have coded the
intensity of conflicts since 1989 in three ordinal variables: (1) Minor conflict; (2)
Intermediate; (3) Full Scale War:
Levels of Violence
Level 1 (Minor)
More than 25 deaths per year
Level 2 (Intermediate) More than 25 deaths per year & a total history of 1,000 deaths
Level 3 (War)
1,000 or more deaths per year
Measurements for Behavioral Violence
Source: Wallensteen et. al.
In the case of Afghanistan, from 1989 to 2001, violence levels have remained as
War. Data for 2002 is missing in the series of studies, yet for 2003, the level of violence
decreased to a level 2. Therefore, in 2003 the death toll decreased from more than 1,000
battle deaths to a toll of 25 to 1,000. Despite this decrease, there is still a significant level
of violence that coincides with drought and high health risks and make Afghanistan
unsuitable for returnees to fully reintegrate, let alone feel safe, in their society.
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CHAPTER IV
Guatemala

Introduction
Massive Maya migrations took place as the direct result of the persecution during
the 36-year long civil war. Allan Burns offers an extensive study on the Maya refugees
in his book Maya in Exile. He states that by 1981 there were over 600,000 refugees
leaving Guatemala. Most were either internally displaced within Guatemalan camps for
them to be watched closely by the army, some sought refuge in Mexican refugee camps,
while others crossed the border to the US. Despite their trajectory, they share a common
purpose; not driven by economic betterment, but by the need of survival and to seek a
peaceful life were they could enjoy their Maya legacy. Today, despite their location,
most Maya refugees are observant of changes in society, but always conscious and proud
of their heritage (Burns, 1993). Trends of Maya refugees have shifted in two directions.
They have either integrated into the society of their host country or they have
accomplished repatriation and the rebuilding of what used to be their home. Figures by
the UN High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) estimate they had sponsored 2,036
people to return to their home by July of 1999 (UNHCR, 1999).
In general, According to Allan Burns (1993) and Elizabeth Ferris (1984) the
North American position on Guatemala has been argued to be one of interference and
ignorance. For example, it has supplied weapons and trained the government’s army yet
it condemns it as a Human Rights violator. Its intervention in 1954 is by far the most
evident demonstration of either the lack of knowledge of Guatemalan society or an act of
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self-interest (Burns, 1993). On the other hand, Mexico has also had limitations and
ambiguity in its asylum policies due to its own economic crisis, as Ferris (1984), Kibreab
(2002) and Labato (2003) suggest.
Another attempt initiated by Mexican and Guatemalan agencies and the UNHCR,
has been a repatriation program, which according to Paula Worby (2000) may be
considered an unprecedented case of international generosity when compared to the
spending in other return operations. These new organizational repatriation models might
serve as important examples for post conflict reconstruction and nation building
(Janowski, 2002).

Historical Background
The origins of this conflict go back to the election of President Jacobo Arbenz
Guzmán, democratically elected in 1944.

Although a former military officer, he

permitted free expression, legalized unions, encouraged more political parties and
initiated socio-economic reforms such as land reforms. Lands were redistributed to
peasant cooperatives, starting by Arbenz’s own land. His aim for Guatemala was to
acquire a more balanced economy with a level of independence and for the end of
caudillismo, or a government fixated on strong leader. Arbenz publicly declared his
intentions were to modernize Guatemala through a strong, independent and capitalist
economy (Immerman, 1981).
Among other controversial reforms was the Labor code that established minimum
wage and higher standards for work conditions. Large employers like United Fruit
Company saw this as a pro communist reform and as a major threat to this latifundio, or
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powerful landowners. The McCarthyism of the cold war era resulted in a “Guilt by
Association” accusation of Arbenz (Immerman, 1981). US refused to sell Guatemalan
government arms, so they had no more option than to buy from the USSR. This made the
US believe even more the Communist rumor and consolidated a reason for intervention.
Richard Immerman also points out that in 1954, the CIA collaborated on the
overthrow of the democratically elected government of Guatemala. The US trained and
armed the coup movement that overthrew Arbenz.

The unfortunate result was an

increasingly militarized government in Guatemala full of corruption. The coup mostly
meant for Guatemala a “set back” in the economy as well as in the social and political
facet. The new military dictatorship was established with Venicio Cerezo on power and
Guatemala subsequently suffered over 36 years of civil war, where Maya groups suffered
persecution by the government’s military that alleged they were harboring the Unión
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).

URNG members emerged mostly

from former followers and supporters of the democratically elected government of
Arbenz Guzmán. According to reports from the Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico
(Historical Clarification Commission or CEH), over 200,000 civilians died and 440 Maya
villages were wiped from the map. In two years, there were already 100,000 to 150,000
reported cases of deaths or “disappearances” and Cerezo’s leadership was characterized
as discriminatory, genocidal and as reluctant to negotiations for peace.54 Also, General
Rios Montt was quoted in the New York Times of July 18, 1982 as telling an audience of
indigenous Guatemalans, "If you are with us, we'll feed you; if not, we'll kill you." (2004)
The CEH released its report based on examination of the causes and origins of the
internal armed confrontation and on more than 9,000 interviews. It presents the methods
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of the violence and its consequences and effects. The conclusions are then presented and
are followed by recommendations to the United Nations.

It concluded that the

Guatemalan Army and its paramilitary groups committed 93% of the human rights
crimes. (See Figure 2) Only three percent was attributed to the URNG. A staggering
83% of the victims were Maya (See Figure 3). The commission strongly criticizes the
Guatemalan government in nature and the North American role in its support. Like the
case of Afghanistan, the weakness of the state and its inability to promote consensus
among its heterogeneous population led to prolonged civil war.55
Formal negotiations for peace accords were initiated in 1990 and they included
the demilitarization of society, starting with the UNRG. They also called for civil
liberties, empowerment and democratization. As a result, Guatemala has undergone
efforts to create awareness of its ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity.

These peace

accords meant the cessation of human rights violations, and the creation of the UNfunded CEH, which covered all aspects of historical and forensic anthropological
evidence for the civil war period and presents all evidence to the UN. It also had the
authority to oversee reparation initiatives by the government. With this, there was a
higher reintegration and monitoring in Guatemala. CEH’s conclusions revealed nearly
200,000 victims were killed or disappeared and out of these 93% were Maya Indians.
They also unraveled 93% of the genocide was performed by the state’s army.

The Refugee Population
Guatemalans found at the Mexican border are commonly peasants. Over all about
100,000 Guatemalan refugees live along the southern borders and were often harassed by
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military incidents of Guatemalan army searching for URNG members. Among the 40
camps the official refugee count by 1986 was of 40,000. Yet there were an estimated
60,000 refugees that had not been reported (Ferris, 1984). Although Maya refugees in
Mexico have been placed in refugee camps, reports from UNHCR show a great degree of
social integration in Mexican society. Examples of this integration include the granting
of naturalization and land titles to Maya refugees by the Mexican government56. In
Campeche and Quintana Roo, all seven refugee settlements were officially recognized as
Mexican villages, and local municipal authorities were established through elections. All
twelve communal credit schemes were systematically registered, which gave members
full access to other Mexican credit institutions. In Chiapas, the authorities assumed
responsibility for all basic health and education services in the refugee settlements. Some
support was provided for infrastructure in settlements on undisputed land. Refugees were
now able to purchase plots of land as a result of the Government’s decision to allow them
to settle permanently where they had been living in Chiapas.
Camps such as El Sexto Sol not only provide the Maya community with a safe
haven, but also with the opportunity to integrate in the local economy by establishing
agricultural, weaving and artisan cooperatives that provide a secure market for their
products57. As another indication of their integration to Mexican society, Maya refugees
have greatly contributed to the Mexican cultural heritage and to the agricultural economy.
For example, they helped restore Maya ruins of Edzna in Campeche and in 1996
contributed to 12% of the agricultural harvest58.
Overall, Mexican camps are characterized by maintaining respect for the integrity
of the community, since refugees are given a basis for self-government. This was very
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successful in avoiding bureaucratization of the operations of medical, food and
educational assistance. The limited budget of the Mexican Commission for Refugees
(COMAR) would not have allowed them to have a presence in each of the settlements. A
system of self-regulation of food and assistance was allowed, reposing on selforganization of the Indian communities.
Mexico has held a tradition of integration and open hands to political
refugees. According to accounts by the Organization of American States, in the
history of Mexico, there have been five cases of asylum being granted on a
massive scale:
Date

Event

Estimated Amount
of Refugees
76,000

1930’s

After the Spanish civil
war
Late
After the exodus caused
Unknown
1940’s
by McCarthyism in the
United States
Early
Chilean refugees from
Unknown
1970’s
the Pinochet Regime
Late
Refugees from the civil
180,000
1970’s
war in El Salvador
Early
Refugees from the
80,000
1980’s
counter-insurgency war
in Guatemala
Asylum grant patterns in Mexico
Source: Ortíz Monasterio “Guatemalan Refugees in Mexico: A happy ending.” OAS.

Article 2 of the Mexican constitution that says textually: "Slavery is forbidden in
the United States of Mexico.

Foreign slaves who enter national territory will

automatically obtain their freedom and be protected by the laws of the land." This clause
extends to Political refugees entering the country, therefore, granting a safe haven for
Salvadorian and Maya Refugees in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
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Therefore, generally

speaking, refugees that have chosen to go to Mexico have been well received (Goldberg,
2001). However, economic limitations in Mexico call for stricter immigration policies.
This has caused a somewhat ambiguous procedure towards refugees.
Local economy in Mexico itself has a serious unemployment issue. This presents
a problem when trying to provide aid, security, food and jobs to nearly a quarter of a
million refugees. The consequence has been a duality in policies towards refugees. For
example, sudden massive deportations occurred on May 20th and July 19th of 1981 based
on the argument that there was no way of knowing if these immigrants were seeking
political refugee or economic opportunities. These circumstances appear to be impulsive
decisions; they do not reflect the common Mexican policy, according to Elizabeth Ferris
(1984). The effect within the Maya population has been negative. According to Kireab
(2002) a sense of belonging intrinsic in refugees’ state of mind. However, they often
enjoy only a fraction of the benefits of the host state and therefore lack a sense of
belonging when confronted with ambiguous policies.
As another result, refugees who have no access to the workforce tend to become
an economic burden and they not always receive services. As a consequence, hunger,
disease and mortality rates are significantly high in their camps. Another disadvantage of
Mexico’s refugee situation is the lack of funds for medical attention, as proven by a
report done for the Forced Migration Review (Alonso et. al., 2001). The report indicates
that for women, the situation in refugee camps along the Mexican-Guatemalan border is
far worse than for males. They often are vulnerable to theft, harassment and sexual
abuse. This is added to that fact that the journey from their homes due to conflict can be
traumatic. Maternal mortality among these indigenous groups is the highest in Latin
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America. The ratio for maternal mortality among Maya women is 211 per 100,000 live
births, while for non-indigenous women it is 70 per 100,000 live births. Contraceptive
rate is also inferior among the Maya refugees, and the camps have the second highest
incidence of HIV/AIDS in Central America. Initiatives to ameliorate the situation have
been taken by conjunctions with NGO’s (like the Marie Stopes México) and the Mexican
government.59 The general results have been a higher education of women’s issues
(among women and men), the decrease of maternal mortality. The result of the high
incidence of diseases in camps, also leads to isolation of refugees from the local Mexican
population, since the Mexican government must take action to control outbreaks within
its population as well.
Rodolfo Labato (2003) and Ferris (1984) argue that the open hands policy in the
case of Mexico has presented ambiguity in policies and this indistinct pattern will
continue due to internal economic restrains in Mexico.

Unlike Ortíz Monasterio,

Labato’s work analyses the long-term effect of refugee integration in society. He predicts
a possible elaboration of stricter policies due to economic and social constraints. He also
states that Mexico’s socio-economic status would have not permitted the integration of
refugees if the UNHCR had not contributed.

With further analysis of the role of

UNHCR, Labato points out that although it is a NGO, it must have a strong political
influence to achieve resolutions such as camp settlements and repatriations. Therefore,
depending on the perspective of local Mexicans, UNHCR’s humanitarian intervention
may be seen as beneficial to Maya refugees, but also as a threat to Mexico’s sovereignty
and a drain in its economy.
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On the other hand, the city of Quintana Roo recently issued a total of 322 land
titles to former Guatemalan refugees who recently became Mexican citizens. It marks the
first time the government has donated land for former refugees that have integrated to
Mexican society. These recipients were some of the 18,000 Guatemalans who arrived in
late 1984 and early 1985 after fleeing Guatemala. Although approximately 43,000 of
them returned home to rebuild their lives, others chose to remain in Mexico.
Guatemalans in Quintana Roo and Campeche have become naturalized citizens in a
process that began in 1996 and ended in August 2001.

This was thanks to the

government initiative of 1996 known as "Migratory Stabilization Plan for Guatemalan
Refugees," where close to 23,000 refugees decided stay in Mexico and to integrate
locally60.
Another report of the UNHCR by Mariana Echandi (2002), states that a total of
2,806 property deeds were granted to both naturalized and other Guatemalan refugees.
For example, Rosalío Alvarado Nojo and his wife María Jorge received the property
deed, which grants equal rights to men and women. "We're able to work in peace, thank
God," said Rosalío. "Who would have thought that we would have been given this land?"
María Jorge later said, "I feel very happy here. And for the rest of my life, I'll feel calm."
With reforms such as these, Mexican authorities have successfully gained the trust and
the social integration of Indigenous refugees.
Two hundred thousand out of 600,000 Maya refugees left to the US. Most
refugees find themselves confronted with greater language barriers, and with such a huge
bureaucracy as the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS, formerly known as
the INS). This is perhaps one of the major reasons for not all of them to apply for
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asylum, but to enter illegally. This causes problems when accounting for how many
Mayas are present in the US. According to Burns, between 1983 and 1986 only 14 out of
1,475 claims were granted. Statistical reports from USCIS indicate that from 1986 to
1992 Central Americans filed for nearly half of all asylum applications (USCIS, 56).
However, the number of individuals granted asylum is reported for Guatemala from 1996
to 2002 remained significantly low (USCIS, 2002).

Asylum cases filed with USCIS for Asylum – Cases approved, denied or referred
after interview from April 1991 to September 2002
Total number of Cases Approved
Cases Denied or Percent of Approval
cases submitted
referred
40,313
3,544
36,771
8.80%
Source: US Committee for Refugees 2002 Report

According to USCIS reports, a small increment in number of asylum grants is due
to the class action lawsuit of American Baptist Churches (ABC) v. Thornburg, which is
mainly extended to Salvadorian and Guatemalan refugees. For the early 1990’s, the
settlement halted the deportation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees and Congress
allowed the granting of Temporary Protected Status (TPS).

Later, the Nicaraguan

Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA) was signed into law
and established new procedures for Nicaraguans, Cubans and some Guatemalans and
Salvadorians. NACARA allows certain “former Soviet block” countries to apply for
suspension of deportation and are granted Lawful Permanent Residency (USCIS, 56).
The extension of NACARA to Guatemala under the assumption that it is a “former Soviet
block” reinforces Burn’s argument that US has demonstrated to be ignorant to the
situation in Guatemala. I emphasize this because the overthrown government had stood
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for the capitalization of Guatemalan economy as well as its economic independence. It
never asserted to have communist links, nor there was ever any indication other than
assumptions made by the US’s cold war policies (Immerman, 633).
According to the UNHCR, there are serious limitations to NACARA applicants
due to the overload of cases received in the USCIS. USCIS refers NACARA applicants
to the Asylum division, which receives general asylum seekers, new arrivals to the US
that claim to fear returning to their countries and oversees refugees. Unfortunately,
NACARA applicants are not the priority. With the asylum workload growing, only 6,000
of NACARA cases will be completed each year from now on. It will therefore take 20
years for USCIS to adjudicate all the cases (USCIS, 2003).
Another obstacle that Maya Refugees found when entering the US was the time it
takes to move from Guatemala to the American border. Many remained for long periods
in towns in Mexico before moving on. This was mainly due to work or simply to
maintain a low profile, since Guatemalan soldiers at times raided refugee camps in
Mexico. This presents trouble for those who seek asylum in the US, since there is a oneyear time limit (from the date the individual last left the country of persecution) to claim
asylum in the US (USCIS, 2003).
Despite certain levels of disparity in policies, Maya refugees in the US, according
to Burns, find convenience in the state of Florida. The climate somewhat resembles the
coasts of Guatemala to where most of them had migrated before in search of work, since
the Guatemalan rain forest was not suitable for farming. There is abundant work in the
Florida fields and bearable living conditions. Despite difficult working conditions, they
do not complain due to their fear of getting fired or of deportation. This same reason
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labels them to most as “migrant workers” and not as refugees that are eager to preserve
their culture and agricultural traditions. This was another set back in the legal arena of
political asylum grants. According to Burns, US authorities argued that the main reason
for Guatemalan migrations was economic hardship. The fact that family members were
killed “was not enough to prove persecution or to qualify for asylum”. A new question
arises. Why was it so difficult to convince the courts of the existing persecution in
Guatemala? Ironically, the fact that they were eager to work presented an obstacle for the
courts to believe they had been persecuted and face danger if they were to go back.
However, when presenting a case to the Immigration Court, it all comes down to
evidence. Personal statements and accounts do not constitute enough evidence of being a
victim of ethnic persecution. Maya refugees often have no land titles to prove they were
forced from their homes, police reports of violent incidents in their community, or any
form of “hard evidence” to prove their asylum statements.
The major Maya community in the US is located at Indiantown, Florida. Living
conditions are relatively better if compared to the Maya at Mexico. However, there is
still a significant crime rate. Unfortunately, Maya agricultural workers are main targets
of robberies since they rarely use banks and keep their wages at their homes or carry
them.

Repatriation
The first attempt for repatriation took place in 1986 as an initiative of the
Guatemalan government and monitored by the army. This attempt had relatively small
success and returnees were set in camps that were constantly watched by the army.
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Unfortunately, the result of this first attempt was a militarized establishment that
suppressed popular movements and opposition.
With a second attempt, the refugees at Mexico and the Guatemalan government
negotiated a second wave of repatriation that would be negotiated with the Guatemalan
state and a unified movement of refugees in Mexico.

This came to be known as

Comisiones Permanentes and had a significant degree of success according to accounts of
refugees themselves. This collective return was not yet funded or aided by UNHCR. Its
terms were defined by refugees and agreed to be followed by the government. These
terms included the access to land and credit for returnees to re-establish their agrarian
way of life and to ensure their sustainability.
UNHCR interfered with the mass returns that began in 1993 in Ixcan-Quiché.
This time, returnees were accompanied with UNHCR officials, members of NGO’s and
Governmental institutions. With the case of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s), they
organized the Comunidades de Población en Resistencia (Communities of Population in
Resistance, CPR) and despite working and organizing themselves in hiding, they
negotiated and paved the way for Maya resettlement and reparations. With such a high
solidarity and organization of refugees, the negotiation achieved higher results than most
repatriation and reintegration programs.61 For instance, the achievement of land
resettlements, educational reforms and economic integration of IDP’s and returnees has
been a direct result of organized mass mobilization. On the other hand, those who
remained in hiding and had no direct participation in the Maya political activism received
no assistance. Their high activism also caused for the Maya to become a political voting
force that was able to define local elections. In fact, in one of their general elections, a
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prominent leader of the CPR was elected Mayor. Peace accords have also been promoted
and the Maya have become advocates for peace and reconciliation processes. They have
also taken an active role in education, health and the economy with the knowledge and
experience they have acquired in exile.62
The role of women in Maya activism has been key to the reinvention of Maya
way of life. Within Maya culture, women’s role is strongly linked to the future and
survival of culture.

As the carriers of children and their role as educators and

homemakers, women have remained as the representatives of Maya tradition.

For

instance, the use of traje, the Maya traditional dress today is often limited to women.
Men rarely dress in traditional clothing today. Weaving tradition among women has also
created a cultural revitalization with the commercial marketing of Maya textiles.
Political activism has also been inclusive towards women. Once resettled into their
communities, women often united to create awareness of the need of women political,
social and economic participation. In some communities however, women’s activism has
been repressed.63
Even though Guatemala has gone a long way in reintegrating returnees, there are
still limitations to the full access to equality for the Maya. Distrust and the fear of
discrimination acts remain, since there has been a conversion of the Guerrilla movement
into a political party. Furthermore, when expectations of return were not met, there was a
slight tendency of withdrawal from the political space.

Expectations for the full

reintegration of returnees have had limitations, mostly due to economic restraints. Due to
the agrarian nature of Maya way of life, most communities still depend on subsistence
farming and outside aid. With the remote location of most of the Maya communities, the
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access to other sources of employment and at times education is often limited. In
addition, infrastructure and services (such as roads, justice, and health) are not always
accessible to these communities. Hence, despite achievements of a degree of integration,
the full integration and equality of returnees is yet on its way.64
Until today, this has been a program that according to Paula Worby may be
considered as an unprecedented case of international generosity when looking at the
spending in other return operations (See Figure 7). She argues that in the context of the
1980’s cold war approach to Central American politics, many international donors were
interested in counteracting U.S. policy in the region seen as prolonging armed conflict
and social confrontation.
Returnees that had been in exile and internally displaced now play an essential
role in being active participants in education, health and cultural programs, influenced by
their experience outside of their homes. Despite pre-existing differences among the
groups and dominant power structures, Maya repatriates have remained faithful to their
communities and to the revitalization of their culture. However, limitations still make
their resettlement an uphill battle.

Most of these communities rely completely on

subsistence farming and on outside aid to live on.

Their communities lack the

infrastructure, state services – such as justice, education and health – and proper trading
and commercial routes. In addition, Guatemala remains as one of the countries with the
most unequal distribution of land, where 2% of landowners control 72% of Guatemalan
land.

The responsibility of further developments lies on the state, but economic

limitations make it difficult to achieve progress. However, there is a consensus within
the international community and neighboring countries that the Guatemalan government
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must officially recognize and repair moral and material damage caused to the Maya
during the war. The returning of land to refugees and to the internally displaced has its
limitations as well.

Most of them have no proof of previous ownership and the

Guatemalan government has no sufficient resources to provide most methods of
repatriation.

The CONTIERRA, (or the Legal Assistance and Resolution of Land

Conflicts) has a mandate to resolve land conflicts, yet it is often limited by the slow and
ineffective activity of the government’s land title agency. Another problem that land
repatriation has is how most internally displaced and refugees fear being persecuted if
they reclaim their lands. Therefore, it is very unlikely for the restoration of property in
the hands of the government to have a significant success.
Upon return, the lack of lands for the continuance of the traditional Mayan
agrarian culture has been unlikely. As a consequence, many Maya peasants have had to
move within Guatemala according to employment opportunities as seasonal laborers,
therefore altering Maya identity.

Findings
Structural Violence
The data for the evaluation of structural violence had to be limited to the data
gathered in 2004 for the year 2003, since WHO does not have the HALE figures for an
egalitarian (or worldwide) value for more recent years. Therefore, for the results to be
consistent with the same time frame, the value of life expectancy used in the equation
was for the year 2003. The average life expectancy for males and females worldwide is
of 59.3.

Population in Guatemala by 2002 was 12,347,000, while life expectancy is
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57.4. Hence, the value for structural violence is 6,892.05. According to the WHO,
outbreaks in Guatemala have not been a significant threat to the healthy life expectancy.
In addition, immunization programs initiated by the state and the total state expenditure
for 2003 was of 47.5% of its GDP.

Behavioral Violence
Observations from the CEH determined violence could have been stratified into
four periods.

The first, from 1962 to 1970 targeted mainly the rural population,

professors and students. From 1971 to 1977, community leaders, labor unions and
students were the main target. The most violent stage was from 1978 to 1985, where the
indigenous population was targeted entirely and Maya villages were wiped out. The last
period (1986 to 1996) targeted all sectors of society.
Despite peace accords and NGO efforts to create awareness, tolerance and peace,
the fear of persecution is still present in Guatemala, since former forces are still present in
Guatemala. For instance, former president Rios Montt has not been prosecuted yet and is
currently the president of the Guatemalan Congress.

According to Armed conflict

datasets by Peter Wallensteen et al. the magnitude of conflict in Guatemala reached level
3 in 1992, a year before UNHCR intervened in mass repatriation movements. The
database does not account for violence before 1989. However, the Center For Systemic
Peace categorizes conflict in Guatemala from 1964 to 1966 as “Sporadic Political
Violence”65. From 1966 to 1996, violence is categorized as “Substantial prolonged
Warfare”66 After 1996, conflict subsided to less than 25 deaths per year. Hence, unlike
Afghanistan, repatriation in Guatemala is more likely due to the significant improvement
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in peace negotiation and stability. In addition, the high levels of activism of former
victims have indicated the opening of political space for returnees.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion

In Afghanistan, isolation in refugee camps, lack of employment and income,
made the refugee population cross the borders constantly in search of temporary labor.
This makes it extremely difficult to truly quantify and monitor refugees and their wellbeing. Despite UNHCR’s efforts to improve repatriation and the proper quality of life for
reintegration, Afghanistan proved to be such a large venture that it made these efforts
ineffective due to the lack of funding and resources to sustain such a large population. In
addition, the case of Afghanistan’s encashment program proved to be an attempt to
“deregister” refugees in Pakistan, rather than aid for repatriation and monitoring of the
situation. Pressure by Pakistan to close refugee camps and to remove all Afghans from
Pakistan makes Afghans unwelcome and harassed, thereby increasing the likelihood of
repatriation despite the unsafe conditions in Afghanistan. Hence, a manner of
intimidation to refugees has been taking place. Once deregistered, refugees left camps
for clandestine societies where they had little or no access to health facilities, education,
food or employment. Hence, the encashment program presented negative repercussions
for returnees and refugees remaining in Pakistan. In addition, false expectations of the
amount of aid to be “poured” into the rebuilding of Afghanistan caused large
repatriations, even when the conditions were not suitable for such a large return. With the
destruction of homes, there was not enough shelter for the vast amount of returnees that
needed assistance. As a response, UNHCR employed the building of additional shelters
through the “cash-for-work” program, which provided employment for returnees.
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Arguments from policy analysis state the encashment program was less costly
than other programs. However, the “recycler” problem proved the program lacked proper
organization and monitoring of refugees. It also demonstrated the weak surveillance
along the borders. Local infrastructure was virtually non-existent, it would take years to
rebuild and the promised funds arrived lat or did not arrive at all. Donors were mainly
interested in the mere survival of returnees, not on state re-building.
Another threat to security was Afghanistan’s ongoing drought and the aftermath
of 23 years of war left the agricultural sector in ruins and the rural population was
consequently unable to make a living once they returned. This has created an ongoing
dilemma in the classification of who is a refugee and who is an economic migrant.
When evaluating structural violence and taking into consideration previous
quantification of behavioral violence, the environment in Afghanistan looks unsuitable
for return and for reintegration into the socio economic arena. Lack of security due to
high behavioral violence has been among the main threats to reintegration of returnees.
The level of incidents has not reduced significantly and violence outbursts are still
common, thereby lowering safety. Warlord regime reinforced by North American tactics
to liquidate the Taliban will continue being an obstacle for the unification of the Afghan
state and for proper stability. According to reports by Human Rights Watch and The
World Today, female aid workers, government officials, and journalists face harassment,
violent attacks, and death threats. In terms of structural violence, facilities, shelter and
infrastructure are the main barriers for the insurance of safety. (Not to mention that 10%
of the country is filled with land mines)
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Despite the recognition of lack of security and the intensification of hostility
towards electoral, governmental and humanitarian workers in Afghanistan, the plans for
repatriation are still on their way and have been encouraged with monetary
compensation. Hence, the pre-conditions established in UNHCR’s mandate have not
been met at the time of implementing repatriation.

This had several implications

including the disregard for the mandate, returnee safety and the proper reintegration,
since there has been no emphasis on establishing stability. However, the disregard of
stability prior to repatriation does not fall entirely on UNHCR activities. As mentioned
earlier in this and in previous chapters, the interest of donors and of host countries seem
to have a direct impact on how UNHCR decides to employ its strategies. In the case of
Afghanistan it may be concluded that pressure to relief Pakistan of the responsibility of
caring for refugees and donor’s interest in legitimizing outside intervention in the country
have been key factors in this case.
The case of Guatemala proved to have a more efficient strategy and as a result, a
different outcome. Guatemala had started its efforts to mend relations before UNHCR’s
intervention and initiated the return of victims.

This initial attempt was strongly

criticized since it was initiated and controlled by the army with the intention of
establishing Indian societies that were controlled and overlooked by the government.
With gradual international intervention this intention was overturned.
As with the case of Guatemala, violence was not entirely subdued and the
political environment for the time of repatriation was deemed unsuitable according to
Human Rights Watch. The difference with Guatemala was the type and degree of
intervention from UNHCR and NGO’s. For instance, the escorting of returnees to the
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specific location of repatriation, and community training programs.

Another factor

present in Guatemalan repatriation was the direct participation and negotiation of
returnees often through the Comisiones Permanentes. In addition, the establishment of
the UN-sponsored Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) ensured the
investigation of events and underlying reasons for violence in Guatemala with the goal of
creating national and international awareness of the necessity of conflict resolution in
Guatemala. It also urged international intervention and called for the unification of
victims and overall, their reintegration to society. These attempts for unification and
mobilization were successful, since there was high solidarity and organization of
refugees. As a result negotiations achieved higher results than most repatriation and
reintegration programs. For instance, the achievement of land resettlements, educational
reforms and economic integration of IDP’s and returnees has been a direct result of
organized mass mobilization. On the other hand, those who remained in hiding and had
no direct participation in the Maya political activism received limited assistance.
Therefore, mobilization and political participation of returnees presented a benefit for
individuals as well as the mending of social and ethnic conflicts. The CEH covered all
aspects of historical and forensic anthropological evidence for the civil war period and
presents all evidence to the UN. It also had the authority to oversee reparation initiatives
by the government.

With this, there was a higher reintegration and monitoring in

Guatemala. Structural violence in Guatemala was significantly lower than Afghanistan
yet had a positive value of 6,892.05. Unlike Afghanistan, WHO reported no outstanding
outbreaks and immunization programs initiated by the state and the total state expenditure
for 2003 was of 47.5% of its GDP.
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Once examining all these aspects of each case, overall the quantification of
structural violence, demonstrated the difference in Health-Adjusted Life Expectancy in
the two cases was quite different. Structural violence in Afghanistan was significantly
higher than in Guatemala. Behavioral violence at the time of repatriation was also at high
levels according to also the quantification of conflicts by the Center for systemic Peace
and the Stockholm Peace Research Institute. Nonetheless, conflict in Guatemala was
more controlled than the ongoing insurrection in Afghanistan. Hence, the likelihood for
full reintegration of returnees to their society was higher in Guatemala than in
Afghanistan.
With the strategy employed, it was clear the encashment program employed in
Afghanistan was not suitable due to the deficiency of proper monitoring of safety and
movement. Guatemala on the other hand proved to be a concrete and comprehensive
assistance due to the proper integration of returnees in the process and of an emphasis in
nation building.
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APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES
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Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan
Asylum
Country
Pakistan
Iran
Germany
Netherlands
UK
Other
Total

1994
1053000
1623331
0
2,050
110
52658
2,731,149

1995
1200000
1429038
0
3644
820
45631
2,679,133

1996
1200000
1414659
0
7830
1260
50487
2,674,236

1997
1200000
1411759
0
12003
1915
50997
2,676,674

1998
1200000
1400722
0
15958
3450
46985
2,667,115

1999
1200000
1325724
0
20256
4645
51066
2,601,691

2000
2000000
1482000
0
23629
5675
76032
3,587,336

Source: UNHCR Statistical Reports, 2003
FIGURE 1

Source: UNHCR Statistical Report, 2004
FIGURE 2

71

2001
2197821
482000
0
26024
15065
88857
2,809,767

2002
1226569
1104909
52289
26001
20305
80221
2,510,294

2003
1123647
834699
46975
26433
21718
82571
2,136,043

FIGURE 3

72

Forces responsible for human rights violations and violent acts.
Guatemala (1962-1996)
FIGURE 4
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Victim percentage identified according to ethnic group, Guatemala (1962-1996)
FIGURE 5

Voluntary Contributions to Repatriation
Source: UNHCR Global Report 1999
FIGURE 6
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